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INTRODUCTION
Asuspicious activity report (SAR) is a piece ofinformation which alerts law enforcement thatcertain customer activity—perhaps a series of large
out-of-character deposits or the cash purchase of a high-
value asset— is in some way suspicious and might indicate
money laundering or terrorist ﬁnancing (and thus criminal
and/or terrorist activity). SARs are sent by members of the
regulated sector(s) (eg banks, money service bureaux, etc)
to national ﬁnancial intelligence units (FIUs) for
processing, and are subsequently (typically) passed to law
enforcement for action. SARs regimes in many
jurisdictions have undergone considerable change in recent
years. For example, money laundering offences have been
redeﬁned (typically with the activities comprising money
laundering broadened), and regulated sectors have been
enlarged to include new businesses, such as lawyers and
dealers in high-value goods. Perhaps not surprisingly, and
presumably due at least in part to the expansion of
regulated sectors, jurisdictions worldwide have witnessed
growth in the number of SARs ﬁled year-on-year.
SARs are thought to deter money laundering and
predicate offences; facilitate the detection and sanctioning
of such crimes after the fact; and disrupt such crimes in
progress (see, for example, Money laundering: review of the
reporting system, KPMG LLP, 2003; Reuter, Peter, and
Truman, Edwin M, Chasing Dirty Money: the Fight Against
Money Laundering, Washington DC, Institute for
International Economics, 2004; Gold, Michael and Levi,
Michael, Money Laundering in the UK: an Appraisal of
Suspicion-Based Reporting, London, The Police Foundation,
1994; and HM Treasury, Anti-Money Laundering Strategy,
HMT, 2004). Despite the atmosphere of change and the
growth in SAR ﬁlings, the impact of SARs regimes on
crime remains unclear. Indeed, the subject of measuring
the efﬁcacy of these regimes on crime has received little
overall empirical attention. This paper seeks to review
some speciﬁc issues surrounding empirical measurement
in greater depth, including the question of whether SARs
regimes reduce crime through deterrence or facilitate
detection after crimes have been perpetrated. The paper
begins with a discussion of the challenges surrounding
measuring the impact of SARs on crime in general, and
then addresses possible metrics for evaluating the speciﬁc
impact of SARs regimes on crime detection.
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF SARS ON
CRIME IN GENERAL
The costs associated with SARs regimes are not trivial
(see, for example, KPMG, LLP, 2003, and Reuter and
Truman, 2004, above for discussions of cost estimates). So
do the beneﬁts of a SARs regime outweigh the costs? The
present paper does not seek to compare beneﬁts with
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costs. But thinking in beneﬁt/cost terms begs the question:
what are the beneﬁts? What speciﬁcally should we
measure? How should we measure beneﬁts? And, can we,
with existing data, even measure the beneﬁts empirically?
The likely answer to these questions is no. This section
explores these issues in greater depth.
To begin, what should be measured? What is the goal of
a SARs regime? Is it to reduce money laundering
speciﬁcally, which Peter Reuter and Michael Levi call an
“intermediate target” (in “Money laundering: a review of
current controls and their consequences” in Michael
Tonry, ed, Crime and Justice: an Annual Review of Research,
University of Chicago Press, forthcoming)? Or is it to
reduce the incidence of the underlying predicate offences
(or might it be to increase asset recoveries)? So the
question for empirical analysis then becomes: in
determining the efﬁcacy of a SARs regime, should we
measure the relationship between SARs and money
laundering arrests/convictions, or between SARs and
arrests/convictions for predicate offences, or even SARs
and asset recoveries? (The present paper does not address
the broader anti-money laundering goals of protecting the
integrity of the core ﬁnancial system and reducing
terrorism – for more on these topics, see Reuter and
Truman, 2004, above). Part of this decision rests on the
quality of available data. The challenge here is that while
the most direct goal of a SARs regime probably is to reduce
money laundering, data on money laundering
arrests/convictions are of poor quality (this is discussed in
the literature – see Reuter and Levi (2006) and Reuter and
Truman (2004) above).
In numerous jurisdictions, ﬁnancial investigation is a
somewhat novel ﬁeld, with the result that
arrests/convictions for money laundering tend to be low at
least in part because investigators have not fully
understood/embraced the money laundering charge as one
worth taking forward. This is changing in the UK, of
course, in part due to the efforts of the National Centre for
Policing Excellence and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary (see Payback Time: Joint Review of Asset Recovery
Since the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, HMIC, 2004 and
Practical Advice on Financial Investigation, NCPE, 2006). The
crime was also often seen by prosecutors as too difﬁcult to
prove; legislative changes to the deﬁnition of money
laundering and the requirements needed to prove the
crime have made this less of a barrier, but money
laundering charges are often dropped in plea arrangements
(see Reuter and Levi, 2006). So while money laundering
was clearly practised in the commission of various crimes,
this fact is not reﬂected in historic data on
arrests/convictions. In addition, as with all research on
crime, data on arrests/convictions represents information
on those criminals who were caught, not the broader
population of all criminals.
Turning from what should be measured, how might we
measure efﬁcacy? To determine the impact of SARs on
money laundering speciﬁcally, or crime in general, we
would want to run some empirical analyses. Ideally, we
would think of crime as a function of SARs and a raft of
other variables; gather the data, run the numbers, and then
explore whether or not our SARs variable is statistically
signiﬁcant. But, sadly, it is not that easy. In a nutshell, the
number of SARs which are ﬁled may affect crime – deﬁned
broadly here as money laundering or acquisitive crime –
and crime may affect the number of SARs which are ﬁled
(of course the number of SARs ﬁled as a variable in
empirical analyses should likely be expressed as a rate,
perhaps per capita). So the position is:
Changes in the number of SARs ﬁled can affect crime
because:
• there may be less underlying crime requiring money
laundering because criminals are deterred by SARs;
• there may be less laundering because launderers are
deterred by SARs;
• SARs may lead to arrests/convictions, pulling
launderers/criminals off the market (and over time, if
replacement is less than arrests, we might ultimately
see a fall in the number of arrests).
And changes in crime can affect the number of SARs
ﬁled because:
• there may be changes in the amount of underlying
crime in need of laundering;
• we may see the same amount of crime, but its
proﬁtability may change, commanding more/less
laundering;
• changes in the legal deﬁnition of laundering may imply
that more SARs are ﬁled on the same level/kind of
behaviour;
• laundering activity may move to unregulated sectors,
with fewer SARs thus ﬁled;
• and the organisation of crime may change (behaviour
may move from one-off to organised crime), with an
unclear impact on the number of SARs ﬁled.
Because of this problem (known as “simultaneity” in
econometrics), isolating the crime-reducing efﬁcacy of a
SARs regime is far from straightforward. This
phenomenon is not new to the study of criminal justice (or
of public policy in general). Indeed, the issue has been
raised in numerous studies and meta-analyses of criminal
justice policies/programs, including examinations of the
crime-reduction impact of CCTV, neighbourhood watch,
street lighting, police, and prisons (see, for example,
Welsh, Brandon C, and David P Farrington, Effects of
Improved Street Lighting on Crime: Protocol for a Systematic
Review, Campbell Collaboration, 2003; Welsh, Brandon C,
and Farrington, David P, Crime Prevention Effects of Closed
Circuit Television: a Systematic Review, Home Ofﬁce, London,
2002; Levitt, Steven D, “Using electoral cycles in police10
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hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime”, The
American Economic Review 87, No 3, (1997) 270-90; Levitt,
Steven D, “The effect of prison population size on crime
rates: evidence from prison overcrowding litigation”, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, No 2 (1996), 319-51;
Bennett, Trevor, Farrington, David and Holloway, Katy, The
Effectiveness of Neighbourhood Watch, Campbell Collaboration,
no date).
The primary econometric response to simultaneity
involves the use of an instrument (ie a variable which
exhibits a relationship between, in this case, the number of
SARs ﬁled, but which is unrelated to rates of crime). An
interesting example of the use of an instrument to
overcome simultaneity emanates from Levitt (1996,
above), in a study on the impact of prison population on
crime. Levitt uses the status of prison overcrowding
litigation to estimate prison’s impact on crime (as he ﬁnds
that prison populations are inﬂuenced by the status of
prison overcrowding litigation—but changes in crime rates
do not appear to affect the status of litigation).
Similarly, simultaneity between SARs and crime may
potentially be overcome through the use of an appropriate
instrument. Some factors which likely affect the number of
SARs but which are more or less insulated from changes in
crime are as follows:
• the SAR reporting sector is enlarged through
legislation;
• SAR reporters are ﬁnding more suspicious activity
(perhaps through better systems, better feedback from
LE, better training);
• reporters are ﬁling more SARs because of defensive
reporting (perhaps following a major public regulatory
action);
• events encourage reporters to ﬁle more SARs (eg 9/11
or 7/7);
• reporters take the SARs regime more seriously.
However, these factors are not always easy to translate
into data, and there needs to be sufﬁcient variation in the
data to tease out true relationships between variables.
Whether a suitable instrument exists is not clear.
Finally, even if it is possible to determine what to
measure (and to ﬁnd quality data for that—not likely), and
to ﬁnd a suitable instrument (again, with quality data—
similarly not likely), it simply may not be possible at
present to estimate the impact of SARs on crime with any
precision. This is largely the case because data for control
variables may not exist. For example, until recently, SARs
appear to have been under-utilised by most law
enforcement agencies in the UK (see Fleming, Matthew H,
Asset Recovery and its Effect on Criminal Behaviour: a Review of the
Literature, London JDI, 2005 (mimeo)). As such, SARs’
crime-reducing efﬁcacy may be spuriously related to law
enforcement use or not of SARs in any analysis—unless
this is properly regulated. So for this and other activities,
like smarter working and the use of advanced analytics
systems in law enforcement, it will be important to control
SAR data quality, SAR ﬁling behaviour, legislation, size of
the reporting sector, etc (all of which can and do change
over time). At present, however, data for these control
variables do not exist.
In summary, it seems fair to conclude that the time is
not yet right to attempt to estimate SARs’ impact on crime.
Efforts should focus on securing suitable data for one or
more jurisdictions, including data for use as an instrument.
In the meantime, it seems prudent, as Reuter and Truman
and Reuter and Levi have suggested, to focus on
intermediate indicators.
MEASURING THE SPECIFIC IMPACT OF
SARS ON DETECTION
While it may not be possible at present to estimate the
impact of SARs on crime, it should indeed be possible to
explore the impact of SARs on ex post crime detection
speciﬁcally. This brings us back—perhaps less glamorously
but certainly more pragmatically—to thinking of inputs
and outputs (but less of outcomes). Inputs and outputs
should include the usual suspects, such as numbers of SARs
received, arrests/convictions for money laundering, etc
(though it is important to be mindful of the shortcomings
of data on money laundering arrests/convictions noted
above).
Critically, however, we will need to be smart about how
we compare inputs to outputs. After all, a SAR may relate
to the activity of one individual, or may refer to a series of
suspicious actors simultaneously. Further, we may see
multiple SARs on the same individual or individuals. With
a hypothetical population of 100 SARs, there is no way to
know, without getting into the data themselves, whether or
not we could expect 10, 100, or even 1000
arrests/convictions from those SARs. SARs may also relate
to false identities, so that even though 100 SARs may
appear to refer to, say, 10 identities, it may be the case that
these 10 identities are really the 10 identities of only one
individual (and it is only possible to convict real people,
not false identities).
The lesson here is that it is absolutely imperative to look
holistically at the data. The concept should be to employ
advanced analytic methods to automatically exploit all links
in the data to build networks of, for example, account
numbers, telephone numbers, addresses, names, and the
like. This should give us an idea of what the data contain in
terms of likely numbers of identities (which can be
collapsed, using advanced analytic methods, to the likely
numbers of individuals). This holistic, networked data view
is a critical ﬁrst step in understanding how inputs can relate
to outputs (and is also absolutely critical in actually getting
the most out of SARs in terms of actionable intelligence). 11
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But more than simple inputs and outputs, we are
probably most interested in how SARs contribute to
knowledge discovery. Put simply, we would like to
understand the beneﬁt (the marginal beneﬁt, in economics
terms) of SARs in terms of the value-add of SARs in
intelligence/investigations (ie do SARs provide a
competitive advantage). SARs have multiple uses, which
include to:
• Identify previously unknown criminals/terrorists, their
activity, their networks.
• Identify the previously unknown criminal/terrorist
activity of known criminal/terrorist.
• Corroborate known criminal/terrorist activity.
• Enhance existing criminal/terrorist investigations (eg
with new avenues).
• Identify/locate assets for cash seizure/forfeiture,
restraint/confiscation.
• Assist in asset recovery enforcement (and, potentially,
ﬁne enforcement).
• Prevent dissipation of assets and/or to disrupt current
criminality/terrorist funding.
• Identify patterns of high- or low-volume reporting for
regulatory follow-up.
• Identify the potential duplicity of regulated entities.
• Identify new threats/risks//trends in money
laundering/terrorist financing.
• Contribute to strategic assessments.
• Satisfy international commitments (see Fleming, 2005,
above).
To measure the impact of SARs on detection
speciﬁcally—to measure the marginal beneﬁt of SARs—it
seems fair to focus on the ability of SARs to tell us what we
did not know before. Along these lines, we might wish to
focus our pragmatic measurement efforts on three things
(in bold/italics, above): SARs’ ability to identify previously
unknown criminals/terrorists; to identify assets for asset
recovery; and to identify new threats/trends.
So given the networked SARs data (discussed above), to
indicate SARs’ value-add other sources of information
should be added to SARs data, such as information housed
in criminal intelligence databases and asset recovery
databases like the UK’s Joint Assets Recovery Database
(JARD). The criminal intelligence and/or JARD data would
be included in the networks of links between/among data.
Then the real question becomes: what do SARs bring to the
party? Our criminal intelligence data will relate to a
number of identities/individuals (which to some extent will
depend on the analytics techniques we have applied to the
intelligence data); how many more identities/individuals do
we know about when we add the SARs data? How many
more assets do we know about when we add the SARs
data? Overall, in how many cases do SARs connect the dots
and expose hitherto unknown relationships? These
comparisons represent inexact science for a number of
reasons—one of which is that SARs may incorrectly
identify innocent activity as suspicious—but are certainly
indicative of the value-add of SARs.
With similar thinking, and smart technology, we can
holistically employ SARs data to tell us about money
laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing behaviour. In this regard,
we can employ advanced unstructured text mining/natural
language processing methods and tools to generate
information automatically on the types of money
laundering/terrorist ﬁnancing which fall from the holistic
view of the data. This information can then be compared,
for example, to known laundering/terrorist ﬁnancing
typologies. As above, we can begin to think about what the
data have told us that perhaps we didn’t know before. We
can also, again somewhat unscientiﬁcally, track the manner
in which this data-driven information changes in response
to changes in a country’s anti-money laundering legislation
(eg when new reporting sectors are added to the mix).
CONCLUSION
Measuring the impact of SARs on crime is,
unfortunately, not a straightforward endeavour. Several
authors have noted this to be the case, and the present
paper has sought to expand on the factors which prevent us
from simply “running the numbers.”
For the time being at least, there is a lack of data and
some complications to the underlying mechanisms through
which SARs affect crime, and crime in turn affects SARs’
present barriers to the application of econometric methods
for estimating a policy impact. While the future may hold
more promise (with better data), this suggests that a more
pragmatic approach is currently required. This approach
should seek to highlight the value-add which SARs bring to
crime detection by leveraging a holistic, networked view of
SARs’ data along with other law enforcement data.
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